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Mira Al Hussein, Christina Gitsaki

6 Foreign language learning policy in the United
Arab Emirates: Local and global agents of change
In an effort to highlight the multitude of local and global forces that can facilitate and
shape foreign Language Learning Policy, this chapter provides a historical exploration
of foreign language policies in a rather idiosyncratic context, that of the United Arab
Emirates (UAE), a country where the indigenous locals are the minority and where the
rulers of the country have embraced the global as a means to empower the local and
usher the country in the era of modernisation and globalisation. English language
teachers/experts and institutions have long been welcomed to the UAE to empower
the nation in its quest of constructing a knowledge-based economy and becoming
a regional and world leader in education, although recently with the advent of the
Arab Spring, a discontent with the English language and its hegemony at the expense
of the Arabic language has been evident in the region. This chapter looks into the
agents, processes and causes of the rise of English in formal education in the UAE and
its struggle to survive the current political climate.

6.1. Introduction
The United Arab Emirates (UAE) is one of the Gulf Arab countries. The UAE comprises
seven Emirates (i.e., Abu Dhabi, Ajman, Dubai, Fujeirah, Ras Al Khaimah, Sharjah,
and Um Al Quain) and as a country it has witnessed an incredible transformation
from being primarily a pearl-trading economy to being an oil-producing economy,
and now a global player in business and tourism over the past three decades. This
development to an economic giant in the region has witnessed an influx of migrants
in the country where a recent census (2010) found that Emiratis comprise only 11.5%
of the estimated 8.25 million people living in the UAE (see www.dubaifaqs.com/
population-of-uae.php). In order to meet the demands of this rapid modernisation
and globalisation, the UAE has long implemented educational policies that actively
promote bilingualism among its citizens. Today, the ability to speak English is critical
for all Emiratis and expatriates alike in the UAE as the country is home to over 200
nationalities from across the globe. The proliferation of English as a second language
in the UAE has undergone a number of phases of growth and suppression fuelled by
explicit but also hidden societal, political and cultural agendas. This chapter delves
into the past and present of educational policies in the Arab Gulf and the UAE and
provides a critical perspective of the endogenous and exogenous forces that helped
shape the current foreign language policy in the UAE.
Mira Al Hussein, Christina Gitsaki, Zayed University, United Arab Emirates
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6.2 The establishment of formal education in the Arab Gulf
Formal education and the teaching of foreign languages are not new, post-colonial
phenomena in the Arab Gulf. The traditional institutions of the kuttabs “were the
precursors of the modern elementary schools” (El-Sanabary, 1991: 12) in the Gulf,
wherein students memorised the Qur’an and were taught basic arithmetic and
literacy by men who were known as mutaw’as; men of religion (lit. “men who were
made to submit to God”). Formal schooling as we know it today, and contrary to what
is commonly known, was introduced to the then integrated geographical region of
the Arab Gulf between 1875 and 1920 by the Ottoman Turks in the western region
of modern day Saudi Arabia (El-Sanabary, 1991). These schools instructed students
in Turkish, and catered mainly to the male children of Turkish civil servants posted
in the area, as well as the children of the local wealthy Arabs (El-Sanabary, 1991).
Turkish was viewed as a foreign language, despite being the language of the governing
dynasty that ruled over the Arab world. As such, the restrictive nature of the Turkish
schools that opened up in the area, admitting pupils based on criteria of ethnicity
and wealth lingered in the psyche of the Arab masses, who may have regarded these
schools as vehicles of discrimination and exclusivity as they catered to the privileged
fractions of society.
In attempting to contextualise the history of formal education in the UAE, it is
important to examine the relationship between the British Empire and its former
protectorates, and the diffusion of knowledge, systems and policies from the ‘centre’
to the ‘periphery’. Given the absent interest of the British to invest in the development
of its protectorates along the Arabian coastline, much of the capital poured into
the development of education came from local merchants (Davidson, 2008), who
imported models of formal schooling along with their staff from other Arab countries
that were directly or indirectly colonised by the British, such as Palestine, Egypt,
and Jordan. The relationship between the empire (centre) and its formal colonies
(periphery) reflected political and economic interests that did not stretch farther
to encompass the Trucial States, whose economic importance until the 1960’s laid
merely in its strategic geographical location along the trade routes, connecting Britain
to India. Enamoured by the scientific advancement of Britain, its political supremacy
and economic dominance, the Arab populace may have conceived specific images of
British systems of inculcation that were able to produce the successful agents of the
empire. As Whitehead (1988: 215) stated:
Most colonial schooling certainly mirrored schooling in Britain, but there is ample evidence to
suggest that this was more a reflection of local demand on part of the indigenous peoples themselves, than an indication of any deliberate British policy to colonise the indigenous intellect.

A similar argument is put forth by Strinati (1995) (cited in Sweeting & Vickers, 2007)
who suggested that dominated groups tend to accept the ideas, values and authority
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of the dominant group due to the widespread belief that knowledge produced in the
West is superior, and the only way towards advancement is to emulate Western systems
of knowledge-production. Therefore, a comparison between the particular centre (i.e.,
Britain) and the outlier-periphery (i.e., the UAE) is prevalent in the following sections
of this chapter, often highlighting the nature of the cultural influence of Britain on
the UAE. It is also worth noting that knowledge consumption from the centre was
not limited to the English language, nor was it confined to the replication of systems,
models and policies of education, as more officers from the UAE were trained at the
prestigious Sandhurst Military Academy than from any other country outside of
Britain (BBC, 2014).
Historically speaking, formal schooling is an evolutionary by-product of formal
exclusivity that has appealed to the masses in the West, where it originated in its
current form. A wealth of literature that seeks to explain the expansion of mass
schooling in the developed countries often links the phenomenon of mass schooling
to the evolution of social needs and problems. It is thought that formal schooling
expanded in society either to solve problems of social integration or to maintain the
dominance of the privileged class in society (Meyer, Ramirez, & Soysal, 1992). Despite
the existence of forms of mass schooling prior to the industrial revolution in Western
Europe (Boli, Ramirez, & Meyer, 1985; Sosyal & Strang, 1989), it is likely that the
economic benefit in the function of mass schooling as an instrument of socialisation
was conceived during the period of mass industrialisation. Formal schooling may have
gained wide acceptance due to it serving as a preparatory ground for factory work,
as it was believed that “the social relations of the school would replicate the social
relations of the workplace, and thus help young people adapt to the social division of
labour” (Bowels, 1971: 129). Industrialisation, it can be argued, has contributed to deexclusifying schooling, such that it created a link between education and individual
economic growth.
The correlation between economic activity and the rise of mass education and
literacy rates in 18th century Britain is evident as the dissemination of practical and
literary skills in schools seemed to have propelled the wheel of industrialisation
and economic growth (West, 1978). Davidson (2008) examined a similar correlation
between the growth of economic activities in the Arab Gulf—namely the pearling
industry that brought certain merchants to prominence, thus enabling them to exercise
considerable political power and influence through the financing of public projects—
and the establishment by wealthy patrons of schools that were mainly staffed by Arab
expatriates, offering subjects such as basic mathematics, geography and history. In
addition to the economic catalyst, mass education was fostered by religious groups,
who had provided the ideological and organisational foundation for a national mass
education system in Europe, insofar as their existence legitimised the authority of
governments and emphasised a national identity for the members of these religious
groups (Sosyal & Strang, 1989). Analogously, the transition from the kuttabs to formal
schooling in the UAE was aided by the acknowledged bearing of these religious schools,
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whose formality and relevance were recognised by the local population. Hence,
formal schooling may have appeared to be a natural transitory process through which
the kuttabs were modified and reformed to respond to the changing socioeconomic
conditions at that time, as opposed to being foreign, transplanted models. Thus, a
number of formal, post-kuttab schools started operating in the UAE in the first few
decades of the 20th century, the earliest of which were the Al-Tatweerya School (1907)
in Sharjah, and Al-Ahmadiya School (1912) in Dubai. These schools, along with a few
others, were the institutions under which most of the “UAE’s first generation of postBritish rulers” were educated (Davidson, 2008: 636). However, Boyle (2012) states that
the 1940’s were characterised by what Schneider (2003), (cited in Boyle, 2012), refers
to as “marginal bilingualism” between the elite merchant and ruling classes, whereby
functional skills in English were picked up through professional contact, in addition
to the growing trend of sending male children of wealthy merchants to India for an
education (Boyle, 2012).
Davidson (2008) discussed the establishment of an Education Department by the
ruler of Dubai, Sheikh Rashid, in 1958 upon his succession; a venture that served to
shift the power of knowledge-dissemination from the hands of the wealthy merchants,
whose endowments financed the earlier schools, to a state-sponsored apparatus of
legitimation and grounding nationalism. Sosyal and Strang view the consolidation
of schooling into nationally controlled schools as a political shift towards the
establishment of a nation-state:
The creation of educational systems has often been described as central to the state’s nation
building. Its mass character brings the entire population under the aegis of the state as members
of the national polity and prepares them to undertake the roles necessary to enhance the external power of the state. In this context, education becomes a duty as much as a right. (Sosyal &
Strang, 1989: 279)

According to Davidson (2008), that is when English was first introduced in the national
curriculum, and with the discovery of oil and the diversification of occupational
needs, the importance of formal schooling increased. The expansion of education and
the establishment of various institutions in the UAE were certainly aided by foreign
investment in the education sector, often to cater to specific groups. The Shah of Iran,
for instance, had established an Iranian school in Dubai to provide education to a
large number of children belonging to the city’s well-established Iranian merchant
community. A number of wealthy Indians had also invested in local education by
establishing schools that catered to the Indian population of Dubai (Davidson, 2008).
The discovery of oil in Dubai in 1966 brought in many foreign workers, prompting
Varkey to open the first private school that catered to the growing Indian community
(Davidson, 2008). Today GEMS have 46 schools in the UAE offering a range of curricula
such as British, American, and Indian.
Boyle suggested that “the arrival of large numbers of English speakers coincided
with the coming of wealth and an improved standard of living for the indigenous
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people,” which created a positive attitude towards the English language (Boyle, 2012:
320). Thus, English Language Teaching (ELT) gained a foothold in the region as a
service industry created to respond to the increasing global demand for English. When
the present day Ministry of Education in the UAE was formed in the 1970’s, English
was initially introduced in Grade 7. English instruction was introduced in Grade 4
in the 1980’s and in Grade 1 in the 1990’s (Layman, 2011). Furthermore, English was
established as the language of instruction in federal institutions of tertiary education
in the UAE. In the late 1980’s, the Higher Colleges of Technology (HCT) were established
as the second set of federal institutions providing post-secondary education to UAE
nationals in English, which diverged from the existing model of the UAE University
that had initially taught almost exclusively in Arabic, but has since revised its policy
on the language of instruction (Findlow, 2006).

6.3 The rise of English in the UAE
The history of taught foreign languages in the Arab Gulf intersected with the cultural
and political encounters in the region that had come under the rule of the non-Arab
Ottoman Empire, eventually transitioning to British protectorship. However, English
as a taught language did not set foot in the region with the coming of the British;
rather it was the missionary schools that were sanctioned by the Ottoman Empire.
The mission schools secured permission to operate schools in areas with Christian
populations, gradually extending their outreach by establishing schools that were
not exclusive to any religious groups. The first one in the Gulf was a school for girls
founded in Bahrain in 1892 by the “Arabian Mission, an affiliate of the Protestant
American missionaries” (El-Sanabary, 1991: 14) followed by other schools in the
region for boys and girls. The non-exclusivity of these schools could have flourished
had it not been for their emphasis on teaching Bible studies which resulted in the
local people viewing these schools as surreptitious offshoots of colonialism, despite
their English-language offerings that had appealed to the elites (ibid.).
The proliferation of English in the Arab Gulf had for a lengthy period of time been
wrought by the shifting political interests, and dominated by economic needs. ELT
policies and the mushrooming of ELT centres in the region can perhaps be traced
back to the change in the political direction of ELT-providing countries, particularly
Britain, following the independence of the Arab Gulf States from British protectorate
rule. Prior to that, contact between Britain and the populations of the Arabian Gulf
was negligible, and no British officials were stationed in the area until the early 1930s,
following the construction of a landing strip for the Imperial Airways in Sharjah
(Boyle, 2012). Although incidents of contact between British officials and indigenous
populations increased, communication often took place in Arabic; a language the
British ensured their appointed officials to the Gulf were fluent in (ibid.). The growing
geopolitical interests of the British in the Arab world, particularly the Arabian Gulf,

102

Foreign language learning policy in the United Arab Emirates: Local and global agents ...

and the need to maintain their monopoly on the trade routes, created a need for
Britain to reach out and ‘converse’ with the populations of the Arab world through
its BBC Arabic broadcast, which was inaugurated in 1938 (BBC, 2007). The first direct
penetration of the British Council in the Gulf had started with the establishment of
the English Language Centre at the King Abdul Aziz University in Saudi Arabia in
1975, expanding later to other Gulf States. The opening of the first British Council
office in Dubai was not all that well-received by the federal government of Abu Dhabi,
which may have been influenced by the prevailing negative sentiments towards the
perceived “cultural imperialism” flagshipped by the British Council at the time. In an
attempt to appease the leadership, the British Council started offering Arabic courses
to expatriate communities in the UAE (see British Council website). In recent years,
the influx of migrant workers to the UAE, with South Asians constituting the majority
of the migrant population, has brought a varying set of languages and cultures to the
region (Boyle, 2012). Consequently, this has created a hindrance to communication
between the growing communities of expatriates from different backgrounds. Thus,
the federal government of the UAE took the initiative to cater to the growing non-Arab
communities by establishing the first English-language radio station, Dubai FM 92,
in 1972 (Hilotin, 2002). This was followed by the launching of Channel 33, a Dubaibased TV station that aired foreign programmes, mostly in English, along with Abu
Dhabi’s 2nd Channel (Ayish, 2013), and the publishing of Khaleej Times in 1978, the
first English language daily newspaper in the country.
The move towards regulating media through provision may have stemmed from
a post-colonial mistrust, and a pressing need to control the content of information
produced and disseminated in English. Nonetheless, the demand for English in the
UAE has profited greatly from the agency of government and its role in propagating
the idea that in order for the country to reap the benefits of globalisation and fully
participate in the global market economy, it is essential to train the populace to
speak the language of international business. Clarke (2007), drawing from the
literature of Findlow (2006) states that the UAE has “accommodated globalisation”
by incorporating English within its policy of linguistic dualism that views English as
the language of “business, modernity, and internationalism,” thus relegating Arabic
to the constrained domain of “religion, tradition, and localism” (Clarke, 2007: 584).

6.4 English schooling: Private and exclusive
If integration was the purpose of mass schooling and formal education, differentiation
was the principle behind private schooling worldwide. In Britain, exclusivity in its
different forms continued to appeal to the social elite, whose orientation toward
private education may have sustained the idea of the availability of better education
that can accelerate upward social mobility and the accumulation of wealth. In the
Gulf, private schooling is synonymous to more English and, in turn, more English
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entails better career prospects and social status. Such views are indicative of the
widely spread perception that private schools attract students from affluent families
and provide the breeding round for networking with the elites.
Unequal access to ELT programmes through differentiation in private offerings that
are only affordable to a certain fraction of society, argues Gaffey (2005), plays a major
role in the reproduction of existing social structures and facilitates the maintenance
of social inequalities. Therefore, English has been marketed throughout the Arab
Gulf region, and perhaps globally, as a branded commodity, which has increased the
demand for it, transforming the language into a marker of status and class within
certain societies. Although this phenomenon has not been adequately examined in
the many studies focusing on the status of ELT in the Gulf region, many reports have
alluded to the evident preference of many parents in the UAE to sending their children
to private schools where the level of English taught is relatively stronger (KHDA, 2011;
Kenaid, 2011; Nazzal, 2014; Pennington, 2015a). Perhaps one of the many reasons why
parents prefer private English schools has to do with the perceived prestige that the
English “brand” bestows on its consumers. Schneider (2003: 246) stated that:
For the indigenous population a command of English gradually turns into an asset, opening
roads to higher status or specific commercial options. Thus, knowing English becomes an ability,
which sets off an indigenous elite; and, therefore, a process leading to a positive attitude towards
the use of English is stimulated. The identity of the English-knowing locals is enriched in a
fashion not unsimilar to that of the English immigrants they associate with: certainly their selfperception at this stage remains that of members of the local community, but at the same time
their ability to communicate with the Europeans opens their eyes to aspects of another worldview and gives them an extra edge of experience and competitiveness within their own group.

6.5 English language policy in the UAE
Today the UAE education system is regulated by both local (i.e., Educational Zones,
Educational Councils) and federal (i.e., Ministry of Education) entities. Public K-12
schools accept only local Emirati students and the curriculum is delivered in Arabic
while English is taught as a foreign language. Once Emirati students graduate from
high school, they have to participate in a federal English exam, the Common Education
Proficiency Assessment (CEPA), coordinated by the Ministry of Higher Education and
Scientific Research (MoHESR). Students who score 180+ on their CEPA examination
(equivalent to the B2 level of proficiency on the Common European Framework of
Reference ‒ CEFR) can enter directly into the undergraduate programmes of one of the
Federal Higher Education Institutions where Emiratis receive free education and the
curriculum is delivered in English. Students who score less than 180 on their English
CEPA examination are required to attend an intensive English language course in
order to improve their English language proficiency. This academic bridge course is
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delivered by the Federal Higher Education Institutions and Emirati students can exit
the course by scoring 180+ CEPA or a Band 5+ on the International English Language
Testing System (IELTS). Apart from the Federal Higher Education Institutions, the
UAE has 76 Private Institutions of higher education were the medium of instruction is
English. According to the Bureau of Statistics, in 2013-2014, there were 35,692 Emiratis
studying in private universities in the UAE (see uaestatistics.gov.ae), while every year
over 15,000 Emirati students across the country take the IELTS test in an effort to
meet the requirements for entering one of the higher education institutions (federal
or private) in their home country. In present day UAE, English language proficiency
has become for Emiratis a pre-requisite to pursuing higher education in their own
country.
Despite the increasing emphasis on English language teaching and learning
across all educational sectors, Emirati students’ performance on standardised exams
(both local and international) has been poor. In 2013, only 20% of Emirati high
school graduates achieved the required English proficiency threshold for entry into
undergraduate degree programmes (Gjovic & Lange, 2013). This was an improvement
from the previous year where only 16 per cent scored 180+ on the CEPA exam. In fact,
during the first ten years of the administration of the English CEPA exam, scores have
steadily increased (see Table 6.1).

Tab. 6.1: Average CEPA-English score, by gender and overall (source: Gjovic & Lange, 2013: 4).
Year

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

Female

152.7

156.0

154.1

159.4

160.3

162.5

162.3

161.6

161.9

162.6

165.5

Male

147.4

149.1

147.5

154.3

155.8

157.9

158.3

157.5

157.5

158.1

161.0

Overall

150.8

153.4

151.6

157.3

158.5

160.5

160.6

159.9

160.0

160.7

163.5

However, Table 6.1 also shows that the average English language proficiency of Emirati
high school graduates remains low (e.g., the descriptor for CEPA 160-169 is: emerging
proficiency, conversational) and the CEPA administrators recommend a further 3-4
semesters of English study to reach the minimal level required for academic study.
In an effort to cater not only for the growing expatriate community, but also for the
English language needs of the Emirati students, private English medium schools have
flourished. According to the Dubai Statistics Centre, in 2010 nearly 55% of Emirati
students attended private schools in Dubai (Layman, 2011), while Lewis (2009)
reported 29% of Emirati families chose private education in Abu Dhabi. In 2012-2013
there were 225,659 Emirati students attending public schools across the UAE and a
further 107,702 attending private schools and with each year the number of Emiratis
in private schools is increasing (see uaestatistics.gov.ae). What was initially a state
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policy to introduce and emphasise English in the K-12 system through to the tertiary
level soon became a national choice for the financially able. KHDA released a report
in 2011 that examined the reasons why Emirati parents are increasingly opting to send
their children to private schools. The report surveyed 75 parents in 10 different private
schools in Dubai. Half of the surveyed parents indicated that private schools offered
better quality learning, while 22 per cent pointed out that better English language
instruction was a determining factor (KHDA, 2011).

6.6 English: A tool for inclusion or exclusion?
English in present day UAE has the ability to resolutely admit or deny Emirati students
access to college degrees through language admission tests, such as the IELTS. Despite
the lowering of the admission scores required to enter university, many students
continue to struggle with English throughout their years of study. A quick scan of
the entry requirements of the three prominent federal institutions in the UAE (United
Arab Emirates University, Higher Colleges of Technology, and Zayed University) clearly
demonstrates that English proficiency, not Arabic, is listed as a necessary criterion to
gain admission to a national, state-sponsored tertiary institution. However, the scores
required for IELTS at the federal institutions (IELTS band 5.0) are generally lower than
the scores accepted at other foreign universities in the country (American University
in Dubai accepts an IELTS band 6.5, while New York University in Abu Dhabi requires
an IELTS band 7.5). The discrepancy in the English proficiency requirements at the
tertiary level is an extension of the public/private school question that was addressed
above. On a federal level, this discrepancy has meant that an additional budget would
be set annually to fund the English foundation programmes, which aim to develop and
improve English language skills before students can commence their undergraduate
degree studies. In addition to being a challenging requirement, the extra year or
two spent in these pre-degree programmes cause students to feel indignant towards
English. In an attempt to bridge the gap between the K-12 system, particularly in
public schools, and higher education, national initiatives were launched to reform
what was perceived to be an outdated model of learning in schools that depended on
rote memorisation and uni-directional instructions.
In 2007, the Madares Al-Ghad (Schools of the Future) were established as a
response to a lengthy examination of the TIMMS and PISA results in which the UAE
scored below international levels (Layman, 2011). The ensuing discussions at the
decision-making level concluded that the problem lies within the inability of public
schools to equip students with a functional level of English proficiency, disabling
them from accessing a great deal of the world’s knowledge in science and technology.
In an effort to raise the standards in Mathematics, Science and English the Madares
Al-Ghad (MAG) were put into operation in 2007. The initiative aimed to promote “the
use of English as the medium of instruction in the core subjects of mathematics and
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science, as well as in English” (Dubai School Inspections Bureau, 2009: 96). Initially
a group of 47 schools from around the country were selected to participate in the
MAG program and the Ministry of Education envisioned that the programme will be
expanded to more schools. However after years in operation with moderate results,
the program has remained largely stagnant.
Another significant step towards establishing a school program to facilitate the
acquisition of English took place in 2010, when the Abu Dhabi Educational Council
(ADEC), the regulatory body responsible for public and private schools in the Emirate
of Abu Dhabi, launched the New School Model initiative to reform public schools
in the UAE. Hundreds of native English-speakers were recruited to teach subjects
of English, Mathematics and Science to students of Grade 1 through Grade 3, while
Arabic-speakers would teach the subjects of Arabic, Islamic Studies and Social
Studies (Ahmed, 2010). The programme is currently in its seventh year of operation
but only in the Emirate of Abu Dhabi.
Both these programmes represent a significant investment towards modernisation
in schools and the provision of teaching approaches and resources that can enhance
not just the acquisition of English but also education in general. However, to date
there have not been any systematic evaluations of these programmes at the federal
level and the Emirati students attending public schools continue to struggle with
English language examinations. Small-scale studies (see Layman, 2011) show that the
benefits of these bilingual immersion programmes have been limited in the few years
of their operation.

6.7 Perceptions towards bilingualism in the UAE
On a linguistic spectrum, the case of the UAE remains a unique one as observed by
Moore-Jones (2015), who alluded to the interesting dichotomy between the professed
linguistic identity of the country and the demographic reality that imposes a different
linguistic dependency on and increases the demand for the use of English as a second
language. It is often unclear whether the status of English in the UAE is one of an
official second language or that of a foreign language whose learners could easily
do without. In a 2008 poll published online by ArabianBusiness.com asking whether
English should be adopted as an official language in the Gulf, an overwhelming 93%
of the 1,021 respondents stated that English does have some place in the Gulf, while
two-thirds felt it should be adopted as an official language (Bowman, 2008).
The poll results are consistent with the results of a recent study conducted by
O’Neill (2014) wherein 712 Emirati students at a federal university were asked, among
other questions, to state their preference for a study language. The respondents were
divided into sub-groups of those who came from an “Arabic-Medium” Public School
(AMPuS) background, and those who have studied at “English-Medium” Private
Schools (EMPrS). Although the majority of students (60.22%) stated a preference of
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being taught in both English and Arabic, an interesting sub-group figure shows that
68.65% of AMPuS preferred to be taught in both languages over 41.09% of EMPrs. That
is, students who had been educated in the “Arabic-medium” public schools showed
an overwhelming preference to be taught in both languages instead of just Arabic.
While there were no EMPrS who chose to study ‘Only in Arabic’, 0.33% of AMPuS
expressed interest in studying ‘Only in Arabic’, which is a starkly lower percentage in
comparison to the 2.64% of AMPuS who wanted to study ‘Only in English’. Likewise,
the percentage of students who chose ‘Mostly in English’ was higher in comparison to
those who opted for ‘Mostly in Arabic’ (O’Neill, 2014). In an earlier study conducted in
2006, Findlow (2006) analysed 340 surveys of students from across the three federal
higher education institutions in the UAE. The study reports similar attitudes towards
learning in Arabic and English, where only 22% of students stated they preferred
to be taught in Arabic, while 50% chose English, and a further 28% indicated their
preference to be taught in both languages.
Despite the evident preference of Emirati students towards learning in English,
the national policy towards ELT has shifted from being receptive and welcoming to
being cautious and often accusatory. This shift may be attributed to the constantly
changing political landscape in the Arab world, which seems to directly impact
policies in education. The significant rise in the number of Emirati students enrolling
in private schools has curiously corresponded with growing sentiments that Arabic
and national identity are at risk of being diluted by English, as English now seems to
represent more than just a language that offers access to the global market. Pennycook
(1994) examined the existence of a tension between two exogenous groups, which
he referred to as the ‘Orientalists’, who celebrated the culture and languages of the
natives while resisting local or ‘Anglicist’ demands for more English, because the
former group viewed that access to the elitist English-speaking world would breed
discontent and political disorder in the ‘colonies’. By extension, this view seems to be
held by the political elite – native orientalists – who are attempting to limit access to
English because of its perceived political overtones.

6.8 Political forces shaping UAE educational policies
The political influence on educational policy and reform in the Gulf has had its
precedent in 1938, when around 400 prominent merchants tried to reverse their
economic decline following the collapse of the pearling industry by imposing reforms
on the ruler (Davidson, 2008). The most significant reform to have come out of this
wave of political disorder was the injection of government funds to support the
education system and contribute to the re-opening of Dubai’s schools, many of which
had to close down following the collapse of the pearling industry (Davidson, 2008).
Despite its short-lived success, it could be argued that the said incident may have
informed future government responses to political unrest, wherein education would
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become the first sector to be impacted, both negatively and positively, as a result of
the need to restructure society.
In the Arabian Gulf, however, political repression was used in conjunction with
social reform. A better case to illustrate the impact of the political environment on
education is the post-9/11 pressure under which many Arab countries, particularly
in the Gulf, had come to address the issue of public schools that were blamed for
cultivating a violent worldview that may have motivated the terrorist attacks (Chughtai,
2004). Suhail Karmani, an ELT professional and founder of Teachers of English to
Speakers of Other Languages (TESOL) Islamia, stated that:
After 9/11, there emerged a troubling view that teaching Arabic and Islam encouraged militant
tendencies, whereas English was seen as promoting the values of freedom, tolerance, and democracy. Some Muslims will naturally feel that there is a conspiracy to destroy Arabic because of its
obvious proximity to Islam. (Chughtai, 2004; Al Jazeera; Karmani, 2005)

Karmani was right in his predictions, as English was met with increased hostility
following the Arab Spring.

6.9 English language teaching in the Arab Spring
A recent surge in scepticism towards ELT, which has been blamed for usurping the
position of Arabic as the official language in the UAE, has incidentally coincided with
the changing political climate in the region. Although a scattered number of scholars
had alerted to the regression of Arabic in the early years of the turn of the millennium
(Al Jazeera, 2004; Al Bahill, 2007), the collective lamenting of the ailing state of Arabic
has witnessed a strong recurrence in the UAE media in the recent years, particularly
in the years following the Arab Spring which started in 2010. Headlines were worded
in a way to explicitly incriminate English, or implicitly hint to an existing form of
cultural imperialism that threatens to erode Arabic: “English proficiency comes at a
cost,” (Naidoo, Gulf News, 2011); “English language threatens Arabic,” (Al Lawati, Gulf
News, 2011); “Lessons in English in UAE schools ‘violation of constitution’, FNC told,”
(Issa, The National, 2013); “English language ‘seducing’ UAE pupils” (Pennington,
2015b; The National, 2014).
The topic of ELT took centre-stage in the UAE Federal National Council (FNC)
agendas and discussions, as well as the recommendations made to the government.
The help of the General Authority of Islamic Affairs and Endowment was enlisted in
campaigning to preserve the Arabic language. Friday sermons appealed to the public
by glorifying Arabic and linking its preservation to piety: “Preserve Arabic to achieve
piety,” (Dajani, The National, 2013); “Arabic is the language of the Quran,” (Dajani,
The National, 2014). Reports on the onslaught faced by Arabic due to the ‘infiltration’
of English has been lengthily reported and discussed in the print media, as well as
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the hashtag social media that chose to bring English to the forefront as one of the
important reasons contributing to the potential loss of national identity and culture.
An alarm-inducing report was recently published in the The National warning
that Arabic is now at risk of becoming a second language in the UAE (Pennington,
2015b). The report quotes Dr. Muhamed Al Khalil, Director of Arabic Studies at New
York University in Abu Dhabi, cautioning that by being taught in English, students
essentially learn to internalise and subsequently reproduce acquired knowledge in
its language of instruction, which will ultimately reduce Arabic to a foreign language
(ibid.). The same idea was advocated by Anwaruddin (2011) in his article questioning
what he perceives to be a hidden agenda in teaching English as a second language,
whereby he states that “second language learners develop an empathy and fondness
for the culture of the people who speak their target language (English) and that English
teaching methods encourage learners to think like the native speakers” (p. 53), thus,
hinting to the impending and eventual loss of culture and identity. The intertwined
relationship between language and culture, and the embedded ‘cultural imperialism’
that transpires through language learning have been discussed at length in the
works of Canagarajah (1999) and Phillipson, the latter of whom observes that this
relationship “dates from a time when language teaching was indistinguishable from
culture teaching, and when all learners of English were assumed to be familiarising
themselves with the culture that English originates from and for contact with that
culture” (Phillipson, 1992: 195).
The hostility with which English has come to be viewed in the post-Arab Spring
days is not unique to the UAE. McBeath (2013) remarks that the post-Arab Spring
environment in neighbouring Oman has been characterised by a subtle form of
defiance against symbols of cultural imperialism, namely the university’s English
Language Centre that witnessed an unprecedented increase in absenteeism during
the tumultuous political period following the Arab Spring. Canagarajah (1999)
had theorised this phenomenon in stating that it is not possible, in fact, to isolate
the classroom from the society, because the classroom is a nucleus, representative
sample of the larger society. The swelling discontent with the perceived cultural
imperialism and its linguistic extension in the post-Arab Spring period culminated
in the introduction of a mandatory Emirati Studies course, taught in Arabic, to all
students of public and private higher education institutions (The National, 2012).

6.10 Conclusion
The history and current status of English Language Teaching in the UAE conflates
exogenous and endogenous factors that continue to shape language policy in the
country. The economic forces of globalisation have hastened the evolution of the
relatively young country, positioning it as a major commercial hub in an otherwise
chaotic region. In order to sustain its economic growth, the UAE leadership has
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focused on empowering nationals through providing them with tools of bilingualism
by which to access global and regional markets. On the other hand, no language is
ever skimmed of its cultural and political associations, and in the case of English,
its not too distant link to its colonial patrons has lingered in the minds of periphery
communities.
The contested status of English in the UAE today is due to its complex ability—
perceived or real—to alter the cognitive environment and behaviour of its speakers,
who are constantly reminded that in speaking a language other than their native
tongue, they are contributing to the loss of their national identity. Navigating the
linguistic minefield of political identity has hampered the ability of decision-makers
to adopt a consistent policy towards language learning, such that a quantifiable
linguistic dualism has not been functionally and effectively achieved on a national
level. It is not always possible to predict the direction to which language policy is
geared in the country due to the constantly changing political environment in the
region that continues to impact educational policies meant to cultivate a specific type
of ‘good citizenship’.
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